Healthpeak Properties, Inc.
DOC Real Estate · REIT - Healthcare FacilitiesNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for DOC yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The filings describe a company with growing top-line revenue but a sharp drop in reported profit, and the excerpts provided do not contain the income statement line items that explain that gap, so readers may want to look at the full Consolidated Statements of Operations and the MD&A results section in the 10-K. Revenue rose from $568.48 million in 2024 to $603.99 million in 2025, while net income fell from $243.14 million to $71.35 million. Those two figures moved in opposite directions for a full year, which is the central tension in this dataset. The 10-K risk summary lists several operating sources of pressure that bear on that gap, including life science lab tenants facing significant regulation and funding requirements, senior housing properties managed by third parties under RIDEA structures, and changes to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. The 2026 first-quarter 10-Q states there were no material changes to the risk factors in the 2025 10-K, so that summary serves as the baseline. On the balance sheet side, the interest rate section shows a material sensitivity: a one percentage point rise would reduce the fair value of fixed rate debt by about $249 million and raise annual interest expense on variable rate debt by about $19 million. Swaps convert the $750 million 2029 Term Loan, the $500 million 2027 Term Loans, the $400 million 2028 Term Loan, and $142 million of variable rate mortgage debt to fixed rates, which narrows but does not remove that exposure. The new critical accounting estimate for real estate acquisitions matters because allocations to buildings, land, and in-place leases determine future depreciation and amortization. The data set includes no forensic scores, so this synthesis does not interpret Beneish, Piotroski, Altman, or Fog Index results. Readers reviewing these filings may want to look at the covenant terms in the March 23, 2026 amendments, the status of the pending Janus Living Offering, and the timing of the 2024 Share Repurchase Program, which expires in July 2026.
Catalyst.Revenues rose to $603.99 million in 2025 from $568.48 million in 2024, an increase of about 6.2%. The first-quarter 2026 10-Q adds a new critical accounting estimate for valuing real estate acquired as asset acquisitions, covering buildings, land, and in-place leases, which affects future depreciation, amortization, and revenue. Recent activity includes term loan and credit agreement amendments dated March 23, 2026, with Bank of America and KeyBank as administrative agents. The company made no share repurchases in the first quarter of 2026, then repurchased 5.95 million shares for $100 million in April 2026, leaving $306 million available under the 2024 program.
Hidden risk.Net income fell from $243.14 million in 2024 to $71.35 million in 2025, a decline of about 71% even as revenue grew. The filing excerpts do not explain that gap. On the debt side, a one percentage point rise in rates would reduce the fair value of fixed rate debt by about $249 million and raise annual interest expense on variable rate debt by about $19 million. Swaps fix the rates on the $750 million 2029 Term Loan, the $500 million 2027 Term Loans, the $400 million 2028 Term Loan, and $142 million of variable rate mortgage debt, but the remaining variable rate debt stays exposed. The pending Janus Living Offering and the company's economic exposure to Janus Living common stock are also listed as risks.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 23.3M
- Change since Aug 31
- −3.5%
- Days to cover
- 4.5
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against DOC. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−3.5%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Healthpeak Properties filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Aug 5, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Aug 4, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- May 6, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310EDGAR →
- May 5, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-05)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- May 4, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-30)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0EDGAR →
- Mar 23, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-23)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation0EDGAR →
- Mar 12, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-04-30)0EDGAR →
- Feb 3, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
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Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
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