Dollar Tree, Inc.
DLTR Consumer Defensive · Discount StoresNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for DLTR yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
No forensic scores are on file for this synthesis, so this read does not rely on Beneish, Piotroski, Altman, or Fog Index values, and none are given here. The reported figures are what the filings show directly. Revenue for the year ended January 31, 2026 was $19.4 billion and operating income was $1.65 billion, an operating margin of roughly 8.5%. The prior year showed $17.57 billion and $1.46 billion, or about 8.3%. These are continuing-operations results, and the 10-K says that discussion excludes Family Dollar for all periods presented. The company's own labeling is worth noting: the 10-K calls the year ended January 31, 2026 fiscal 2025, so readers comparing it with other sources should check the period. The company reports approximately 9,000 stores across 48 states and the District of Columbia, plus approximately 275 stores in Canada. About 40% of items are automatically replenished, and about 8,400 items are carried per store. Closeout and promotional merchandise is described as less than 10% of purchases. The $793 million in total sale cash, including about $680 million of net proceeds and about $113 million monetized through working capital reduction, is a sale proceeds figure and not an operating result. Management's stated priorities, including new store growth, store refresh programs, and supply chain investment, depend on continued execution. The excerpt provided does not include the full MD&A liquidity or debt discussion, so cash flow, debt instruments, and balance sheet strength cannot be assessed from this data. Readers may want to look at the full Item 7 liquidity section, Note 2 on discontinued operations, and Note 13 on category sales. The tariff and sourcing language in Item 1 also deserves a closer read alongside the full Item 1A risk factor list, which this excerpt does not reach.
Catalyst.Management's narrative centers on running Dollar Tree as a standalone banner after the July 5, 2025 sale of Family Dollar to 1959 Holdings, LLC, which generated about $793 million in total cash. The 10-K says the company is pursuing an expanded assortment, agile cost management, new store growth, and store refresh programs outlined at its October 15, 2025 Investor Day. Revenue for the year ended January 31, 2026 was $19.4 billion, up from $17.57 billion the prior year, about 10.4% higher. Operating income rose to $1.65 billion from $1.46 billion. The company also cites delivery partnerships with Instacart and Uber Eats, with over 8,800 stores serviceable through Uber Eats.
Hidden risk.The most easily missed tension is comparability. The XBRL series shows $30.58 billion of revenue for fiscal 2024 and an operating loss of $881.8 million, which appears inconsistent with the 10-K's statement that Family Dollar is presented as discontinued operations for all periods. Readers should verify the comparison basis before reading the swing between years as a trend. Separately, Item 1 states that roughly 40% of merchandise is imported directly, with China the source of a vast majority of those imports, and that purchasing is largely order-by-order with no material long-term supply contracts. That leaves cost exposure to tariffs, which management says it is actively working to offset.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 7.2M
- Change since Aug 31
- −2.3%
- Days to cover
- 2.5
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against DLTR. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−2.3%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Dollar Tree filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 25, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.03: Charter or bylaw change; fiscal-year changeEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 27, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Aug 27, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- May 7, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-07)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- May 1, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-06-16)0EDGAR →
- Mar 23, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-19)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement0EDGAR →
- Mar 16, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-16)Unknown Item incorporated by reference into this...0EDGAR →
- Mar 16, 202610-KAnnual report (2026-01-31)Period: 2026-01-310EDGAR →
- Dec 3, 202510-QQuarterly report (2025-11-01)Period: 2025-11-010EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
View on Amazon →The Interpretation of Financial Statements
The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.
View on Amazon →Quality of Earnings
Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.
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