Digital Realty Trust, Inc.

DLR Real Estate · REIT - Specialty
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$174.47
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$146.23 — $208.14
-16% from high
Market cap
65.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.8%
P/E
84.7
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for DLR yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

This synthesis rests only on the annual XBRL facts provided, so it cannot test management's narrative against the MD&A, risk factors, or news. No forensic scores are on file, so none are reported here. The Beneish M-Score is a screening model that uses relationships among receivables, margins, asset quality, and accruals to flag possible earnings manipulation; a flagged result calls for a closer read, not proof of wrongdoing. The Piotroski F-Score is a checklist of accounting and profitability signals, and the Altman Z-Score is a bankruptcy-risk model generally designed for non-financial firms, so it would need careful handling for a real estate investment trust. The Fog Index measures text readability and cannot be applied without filing text. Taken alone, the numbers show revenue rising from $3.05 billion in 2018-FY to $6.11 billion in 2025-FY, roughly doubling, while total assets rose from $23.77 billion to $49.41 billion over the same span. That pattern is consistent with a business that has grown its asset base substantially. Net income of $1.31 billion in 2025-FY compares with $331.25 million in 2018-FY, but the 2025 figure sits well above operating income, which signals that non-operating items matter a great deal. Readers may want to look at the MD&A liquidity discussion and the risk-factor section of the company's annual report, then reconcile net income to operating income in the income statement to see what drives the difference.

Catalyst.The data on file shows top-line momentum but does not explain its drivers. Revenue reached $6.11 billion in 2025-FY, up from $5.55 billion in 2024-FY, a year-over-year increase of about 10.1%. The prior year grew only about 1.3%, from $5.48 billion in 2023-FY. Operating income rose to $658.49 million from $471.86 million, about 39.5% higher, lifting operating margin to roughly 10.8% from 8.5%. Because no MD&A text is on file, this synthesis cannot say which segments, customers, or programs produced this growth.

Hidden risk.The most notable tension is that 2025-FY net income of $1.31 billion was roughly double operating income of $658.49 million. In 2021-FY, net income of $1.71 billion also exceeded operating income of $694.01 million. Net income therefore depends heavily on items below operating income that the provided data does not explain. Net income also fell about 36.5% in 2024-FY, from $948.84 million to $602.49 million, even as revenue rose, so year-to-year earnings have been volatile. Total assets grew from $23.07 billion in 2019-FY to $49.41 billion in 2025-FY. Risk-factor text is not on file, so the filing's own description of these exposures is not covered here.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what DLR reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.7%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
9M
Change since Aug 31
+7.2%
Days to cover
4.3

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against DLR. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+7.2%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.3 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Digital Realty Trust filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials); Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 6, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 19, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 31, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-17)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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