Dollar General Corporation

DG Consumer Defensive · Discount Stores
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$133.89
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$95.11 — $158.23
-15% from high
Market cap
29.5B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.8%
P/E
17.4
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for DG yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

This synthesis rests on two income-statement series from XBRL company facts: revenues and operating income for fiscal years 2021 through 2026. The dataset includes no forensic scores, so this analysis does not cite a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index for Dollar General, and no score is described here. Readers who want that screening may want to look at the company's full filings on the SEC EDGAR system, where the underlying statements can be reviewed. The management narrative is also absent: there is no MD&A text, no risk-factor text, and no FACT-classified news on file. That means this write-up cannot name the segments, store programs, debt instruments, legal matters or regulatory items that a full reading of the annual report would cover, and it cannot explain why operating income moved as it did. What the numbers do show is a business whose top line rose in every year of the series, with revenues up from $34.22 billion in fiscal 2022 to $42.72 billion in fiscal 2026. Over the same span, operating income went from $3.22 billion to $2.2 billion, and the operating margin compressed from about 9.4% to about 5.2%. Readers may want to compare the MD&A discussion of costs, pricing and product mix against these figures, since the gap between rising sales and lower operating margin is the central question the data raises. The dataset also contains no cash flow, balance sheet or debt figures, so liquidity and leverage cannot be assessed from this set.

Catalyst.The only operating data on file is the revenue and operating income trend. Revenues rose from $40.61 billion in fiscal 2025 to $42.72 billion in fiscal 2026, an increase of about 5.2%, continuing a run of annual growth from $34.22 billion in fiscal 2022. Operating income rose about 28.7% over the same year, from $1.71 billion to $2.2 billion, so the latest year's sales growth came with higher operating profit dollars. The MD&A text that would explain the drivers is not in this dataset, so the specific causes of this growth cannot be confirmed here.

Hidden risk.The most visible tension is margin. Operating income as a share of revenue was about 10.5% in fiscal 2021, 9.4% in fiscal 2022, 8.8% in fiscal 2023, 6.3% in fiscal 2024, 4.2% in fiscal 2025 and 5.2% in fiscal 2026. Revenue grew about 26.6% from fiscal 2021 to fiscal 2026 while operating income fell about 38%, from $3.55 billion to $2.2 billion. A reader who looks only at the revenue headline could miss this. The filing text that would explain the cause, including any risk factors, is not in this dataset, so this section does not attribute the decline to any specific factor.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what DG reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
3.4%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
6.7M
Change since Aug 31
+13.0%
Days to cover
2.6

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against DG. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 13.0% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.6 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Dollar General filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 27, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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