Dominion Energy, Inc.
D Utilities · Utilities - Regulated ElectricNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for D yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
No forensic scores are on file for Dominion, so this synthesis does not give a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index value, and none of those scores is interpreted here. The absence of a score in this data set is not a clean result; it only means the screen was not run on the data provided. What the reported figures do show is a regulated electric utility whose headline profit measures grew in 2025. Net income of $3.00 billion against revenue of $16.52 billion implies a net margin of about 18.2%, compared with about 14.9% in 2024 ($2.12 billion on $14.18 billion). That is a meaningful change in profit per dollar of revenue, but the filing text that would explain it, including regulatory rate decisions, the utility's capital program, or its debt instruments, is not available in this data set. Without MD&A or risk-factor text, the specific programs, legal matters, and debt instruments that a careful reader would normally check cannot be named here. The longer history also matters. Revenue was $10.89 billion in 2018 and $17.73 billion in 2022, and operating income has ranged from $1.6 billion to $4.41 billion across the years provided. Because revenue and operating income moved in different directions in some years, a reader may want to compare the income statement with the cash flow statement and balance sheet in the 10-K before drawing conclusions about the trend. The two years of net income available cannot establish a multi-year pattern. Taken together, the figures support a narrower statement: the most recent year shows higher revenue, operating income, and net income than 2024, while the earlier record shows substantial year-to-year variation whose causes are not explained in the data provided.
Catalyst.The figures provided show revenue rising from $14.18 billion in 2024 to $16.52 billion in 2025, an increase of about 16.5%. Operating income rose from $3.25 billion to $4.41 billion, up about 35.7%, and net income climbed from $2.12 billion to $3.00 billion, up about 41.5%. Operating margin, calculated as operating income divided by revenue, widened from about 22.9% to about 26.7%. The MD&A text that would explain what drove these results is not on file for this synthesis, so the drivers cannot be named from the filing text provided here.
Hidden risk.The most visible tension in the numbers is volatility. Revenue fell from $17.73 billion in 2022 to $13.49 billion in 2023, a drop of about 23.9%, while operating income rose from $1.6 billion to $3.41 billion over the same two years. Operating income was $3.6 billion in 2018 and $2.06 billion in 2020, so the multi-year record is uneven. The data here does not include risk-factor text, so the causes of these swings cannot be confirmed. Readers may want to look at the risk-factors section of the 10-K for an explanation of the changes.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 24.9M
- Change since Aug 31
- −8.2%
- Days to cover
- 4.9
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against D. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−8.2%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Dominion Energy filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 14, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Sep 3, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.07: Shareholder vote results0EDGAR →
- Aug 25, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Jul 31, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Jul 31, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
View on Amazon →The Interpretation of Financial Statements
The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.
View on Amazon →Quality of Earnings
Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.
View on Amazon →