Dominion Energy, Inc.

D Utilities · Utilities - Regulated Electric
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$62.86
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$55.85 — $72.99
-14% from high
Market cap
55.3B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.3%
P/E
21.8
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for D yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

No forensic scores are on file for Dominion, so this synthesis does not give a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index value, and none of those scores is interpreted here. The absence of a score in this data set is not a clean result; it only means the screen was not run on the data provided. What the reported figures do show is a regulated electric utility whose headline profit measures grew in 2025. Net income of $3.00 billion against revenue of $16.52 billion implies a net margin of about 18.2%, compared with about 14.9% in 2024 ($2.12 billion on $14.18 billion). That is a meaningful change in profit per dollar of revenue, but the filing text that would explain it, including regulatory rate decisions, the utility's capital program, or its debt instruments, is not available in this data set. Without MD&A or risk-factor text, the specific programs, legal matters, and debt instruments that a careful reader would normally check cannot be named here. The longer history also matters. Revenue was $10.89 billion in 2018 and $17.73 billion in 2022, and operating income has ranged from $1.6 billion to $4.41 billion across the years provided. Because revenue and operating income moved in different directions in some years, a reader may want to compare the income statement with the cash flow statement and balance sheet in the 10-K before drawing conclusions about the trend. The two years of net income available cannot establish a multi-year pattern. Taken together, the figures support a narrower statement: the most recent year shows higher revenue, operating income, and net income than 2024, while the earlier record shows substantial year-to-year variation whose causes are not explained in the data provided.

Catalyst.The figures provided show revenue rising from $14.18 billion in 2024 to $16.52 billion in 2025, an increase of about 16.5%. Operating income rose from $3.25 billion to $4.41 billion, up about 35.7%, and net income climbed from $2.12 billion to $3.00 billion, up about 41.5%. Operating margin, calculated as operating income divided by revenue, widened from about 22.9% to about 26.7%. The MD&A text that would explain what drove these results is not on file for this synthesis, so the drivers cannot be named from the filing text provided here.

Hidden risk.The most visible tension in the numbers is volatility. Revenue fell from $17.73 billion in 2022 to $13.49 billion in 2023, a drop of about 23.9%, while operating income rose from $1.6 billion to $3.41 billion over the same two years. Operating income was $3.6 billion in 2018 and $2.06 billion in 2020, so the multi-year record is uneven. The data here does not include risk-factor text, so the causes of these swings cannot be confirmed. Readers may want to look at the risk-factors section of the 10-K for an explanation of the changes.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what D reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.8%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
24.9M
Change since Aug 31
−8.2%
Days to cover
4.9

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against D. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−8.2%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Dominion Energy filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 25, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 31, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →