CSX Corporation

CSX Industrials · Railroads
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$48.69
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$33.63 — $53.60
-9% from high
Market cap
90.2B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.1%
P/E
27.8
Trailing
Verdict status · Oct 16, 2026

Not yet scored

Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for CSX yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.

No verdict yet
RED DEEP Scores pending shown after the next data refresh
Composite Health
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The data provided supports a narrow conclusion. Across the eight fiscal years on file, from 2018 through 2025, CSX's revenue ranged from a low of $10.58 billion in 2020 to a high of $14.85 billion in 2022, and 2025 revenue of $14.09 billion sits near the upper part of that range. Operating income has been less steady. It rose to $6.02 billion in 2022, then declined each year to $4.52 billion in 2025, the lowest figure since $4.36 billion in 2020. Operating margin of about 32.1% in 2025 is also below the roughly 39.8% implied by 2018 figures, so the business is converting a smaller share of revenue into operating profit than it did several years earlier. The filings provided do not include MD&A or risk-factor text, so this analysis cannot name the segments, commodity exposures, debt instruments, regulatory matters, or legal proceedings that management or the company's risk disclosures identify as relevant. No forensic scores are on file, so no Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index reading is reported here. The Beneish M-Score is a screen for patterns that can accompany earnings manipulation, and an elevated reading would call for a closer read rather than prove wrongdoing. The Piotroski F-Score counts how many financial-strength checks a company passes. The Altman Z-Score estimates financial distress risk using a zone label. The Fog Index estimates how hard a document is to read. Each would be informative here, but none can be interpreted without the underlying data. Readers may want to look at the forensic reviews and risk-factor sections of CSX's annual report, and to compare the reported profit decline against management's own explanation of it.

Catalyst.The provided filing data does not include MD&A text, so this section cannot report management's explanation for results. What the reported figures show is a modest revenue decline in 2025: $14.09 billion versus $14.54 billion in 2024, a change of about negative 3.1%. Operating income fell more steeply, from $5.25 billion to $4.52 billion, about negative 13.9%, and net income fell from $3.47 billion to $2.89 billion, about negative 16.7%. Revenue has also declined from its 2022 peak of $14.85 billion. Readers may want to look at the MD&A in CSX's annual report directly to see what management attributes these changes to.

Hidden risk.The most visible tension in these numbers is that profit is falling faster than sales. Operating margin, meaning operating income divided by revenue, moved from about 36.1% in 2024 to about 32.1% in 2025, and net margin moved from about 23.9% to about 20.5%. Net income dropped about 16.7%, more than the 13.9% decline in operating income, which suggests that items below operating income also weighed on results. The data provided does not identify those items. With no risk-factor text, no forensic scores, and no cash flow or balance sheet figures on file, this analysis cannot judge whether the decline is cyclical or structural.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what CSX reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.3%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
43M
Change since Aug 31
+4.7%
Days to cover
4.0

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against CSX. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+4.7%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.0 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Quarterly report

The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) CSX Corporation filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 22, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 22, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →