Capital One Financial Corporation
COF Financial Services · Credit ServicesNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for COF yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The data provided for Capital One Financial Corporation contains only two annual series from XBRL company facts: total revenues and net income, covering fiscal years 2018 through 2025. No Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score, or Fog Index is on file, so this synthesis gives no forensic score values and draws no conclusions from them. These scores are screening tools rather than proof of anything, and their absence means this data cannot test manipulation risk, financial distress, or the readability of the filing. The data also lacks MD&A text, risk-factor text, and classified news headlines, so the synthesis cannot connect the numbers to management's explanations or to the risks the company itself discloses. Across the eight-year span, revenues rose from $3.43 billion in 2018 to $8.06 billion in 2025, and 2025 is the highest revenue figure in the series. Net income moved in the opposite direction in the most recent year. It peaked at $12.39 billion in 2021, fell to $7.36 billion in 2022 and $4.89 billion in 2023, and reached $2.45 billion in 2025. That 2025 figure is about 19.8% of the 2021 peak and is the lowest net income value in the series, below the $2.71 billion reported for 2020. A reader can see the direction of these figures but not their cause from this data alone. Readers may want to compare these annual figures with the company's annual report and Form 10-K, where the MD&A and risk-factor disclosures that this data set does not include would explain the drivers behind the revenue and earnings changes.
Catalyst.The data on file contains no MD&A text, so this paragraph cannot attribute any driver to management. The reported figures show total revenues rising from $5.92 billion in 2024 to $8.06 billion in 2025, an increase of about 36.1%. Over the same period, net income fell from $4.75 billion to $2.45 billion, a decline of about 48.4%. Readers may want to look at the MD&A section of the company's annual report directly to see what management attributes these changes to, since that narrative is outside the data provided here.
Hidden risk.The most visible tension in the reported numbers is the divergence between the two lines: revenue grew by about 36.1% while net income fell by about 48.4% in 2025. Net income as a share of revenue dropped from about 80.2% in 2024 to about 30.4% in 2025. The data on file contains no risk-factor text, no balance-sheet or cash-flow figures, and no forensic scores, so this paragraph cannot say what causes the gap. A careful reader may want to check the income statement and the risk-factor section of the filing to understand why earnings did not keep pace with revenue.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 9M
- Change since Aug 31
- −18.6%
- Days to cover
- 2.5
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against COF. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 18.6% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Quarterly report
The quarterly report (10-Q) and current reports (8-K) Capital One Financial filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 15, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Sep 15, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Sep 14, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Sep 1, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.03: Charter or bylaw change; fiscal-year changeEDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 20, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 8.01: Other events0EDGAR →
- Aug 14, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Jul 28, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Jul 21, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Jul 21, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
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