Crown Castle Inc.
CCI Real Estate · REIT - SpecialtyNot yet scored
Filing.fyi has not computed forensic scores for CCI yet. Scores appear after the company's next data refresh.
What the filing actually says.
The filings describe a tower-only company being reorganized around a single, contract-based business, and the figures provided support parts of that picture while leaving important gaps. No forensic scores (Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index) are on file for this company, so this synthesis gives no score values and draws no conclusion from them; readers may want to run those screens themselves once the data is available. On the XBRL series, revenues rose from $210 million in 2024 to $215 million in 2025, roughly 2.4%, while operating income moved from a loss of $2.94 billion in 2024 to income of $2.08 billion in 2025. The revenue series, however, sits far below the scale of the continuing towers business described in the MD&A and is hard to reconcile with the 2023 figure of $449 million, so readers should check these tags against the consolidated statements of operations rather than rely on them alone. The filing text offers more concrete anchors. Per the 2025 10-K, about 40% of towers Adjusted Site Rental Gross Margin came from land the company owns, and about 60% came from land it leases, subleases, manages or licenses, with an average total remaining land contract life of about 35 years including renewals. The company reports sustaining capital expenditures below 1% of net revenues and a weighted-average debt interest rate of 3.9%, with the vast majority of debt at fixed rates. As a REIT, it must distribute at least 90% of its REIT taxable income, which explains the dividend emphasis in its strategy and limits the cash it can retain for growth. Management's narrative of durable, long-term contractual cash flows is supported by the tenant contract disclosures, but readers may want to weigh that narrative against the DISH default, the carrier concentration and the $345 million disposal loss recognized for the first quarter of 2026.
Catalyst.Management's current story is the completed exit from fiber. The Strategic Fiber Transaction closed on May 1, 2026, with aggregate cash proceeds of $8.4 billion, representing a gross contractual purchase price of $8.5 billion less $124 million of preliminary purchase price adjustments that remain subject to post-closing settlement. Going forward, the company reports one segment, towers, where site rental revenues were 95% of first quarter 2026 consolidated net revenues. The MD&A names tenant additions on existing towers as the core growth driver, with discretionary capital expenditures of $50 million in the first quarter of 2026. A 2026 Restructuring Plan, initiated in February 2026, is described as an effort to improve the efficiency of the tower business.
Hidden risk.The most material tension is concentration and contract durability. T-Mobile, AT&T and Verizon Wireless accounted for about 90% of 2025 site rental revenues and about 93% of first quarter 2026 site rental revenues. The 10-K discloses a notice of default and termination delivered to DISH, and the $23.2 billion of expected future cash inflows as of March 31, 2026 excludes amounts due under the DISH Master Lease Agreement. The weighted-average remaining term shortened from about six years at December 31, 2025 to about five years at March 31, 2026. Readers may want to look at note 18 and the DISH-related risk factors. The fiber sale also carried a $345 million loss from disposal of discontinued operations for the first quarter of 2026.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 9.5M
- Change since Aug 31
- −2.1%
- Days to cover
- 2.7
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against CCI. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−2.1%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.7 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Crown Castle filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 14, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)EDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Aug 5, 202610-QQuarterly report0EDGAR →
- Aug 5, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Jul 22, 20268-KCurrent reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- May 7, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310EDGAR →
- May 1, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-01)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- May 1, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-05-01)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement0EDGAR →
- Apr 22, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-22)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0EDGAR →
- Apr 6, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-05-20)0EDGAR →
- Feb 23, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
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