Brown & Brown, Inc.

BRO Financial Services · Insurance Brokers
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$67.98
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$53.81 — $90.46
-25% from high
Market cap
22.7B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.0%
P/E
21.4
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Watch.

Acquisition-fueled growth at Brown & Brown masks flat organic revenue and nearly doubled debt.

Caution Altman Z″: 1.96Piotroski: 3/9Fog: 18.9
RED DEEP 43 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.96
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
3
Weak fundamentals
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
18.92
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings show a company whose reported scale has grown sharply while the quality signals are mixed. Revenue reached $5.9 billion in 2025 against $4.8 billion in 2024, and operating cash flow of $1.45 billion was 1.38 times net income of $1.05 billion, a ratio the data reports directly. Equity rose to $12.57 billion from $6.44 billion, and total assets rose to $29.99 billion from $17.61 billion, which is consistent with the Accession transaction described in the risk factors. The forensic scores call for careful reading. The Altman Z-Score for the Z-double-prime variant is 1.96, which falls in the grey zone. The label states that Altman Z is not designed for banks or financial firms, so this reading should be treated with caution rather than as a solvency signal. The Piotroski F-Score is 3 of 8 computable signals, meaning three of the eight checklist items that could be computed were met, which is a weak reading on that scale. The Fog Index of 18.92 places the MD&A in the very hard to read band, above the 18 threshold. This matters because the Organic Revenue and Contingents discussion sits in that dense text. Readers may want to look at the non-GAAP reconciliations for Organic Revenue and EBITDAC - Adjusted alongside the GAAP income statement, and to see how the debt covenants described in the risk factors may constrain the company as borrowings grow. Contingents are estimated and accrued before they are paid, and the filing says the amounts may differ from the estimates, so year-end accruals may later change. The filings describe a business that has historically grown through new business, customer retention, and acquisitions. Readers may want to track whether organic growth holds up once acquisition synergies are fully absorbed.

Catalyst.Brown & Brown describes itself as a diversified insurance agency and wholesale brokerage. Revenue rose to $5.9 billion in 2025 from $4.8 billion in 2024, a 22.8% increase. The filings tie the growth to the Accession acquisition, which the company closed in the third quarter of 2025 and which led it to consolidate from three segments to two. In the 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026, total commissions and fees grew 32.4% for the three months. Income before income taxes rose $72 million, or 23.2%, which management attributes to higher Contingents, expense leverage, Accession synergies, recent acquisitions, and a change in estimated earn-out payables.

Hidden risk.Organic Revenue decreased 0.7% in the quarter, and Organic Revenue with Contingents grew only 0.7%, so the headline growth depends heavily on acquisitions. Long-term debt rose to $6.89 billion at year-end 2025 from $3.6 billion a year earlier, and the risk factors state that financing the Transaction increased indebtedness and that covenant failures could occur. Contingents, which averaged about 4.4% of commissions and fees over three years, depend on underwriting results and can be affected by natural disasters. The Altman Z-Score sits in the grey zone, and the label notes that this measure is not designed for financial firms, so it should be read with caution.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what BRO reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
5.6%
of the shares available to trade
Moderate
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
14.1M
Change since Aug 31
+1.8%
Days to cover
6.4

What it tells us

A noticeable minority of traders is betting that BRO shares will fall.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+1.8%).

Short sellers would need about 6.4 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Brown & Brown filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-09)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-10)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-07-27)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 27, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • May 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-06)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-27)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 27, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-08)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 24, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-06)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 12, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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