Builders FirstSource, Inc.

BLDR Industrials · Building Products & Equipment
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$53.68
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$49.67 — $131.50
-59% from high
Market cap
5.8B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
58.3
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Builders FirstSource revenue fell 7.4% in 2025 and net income dropped to $435.2 million.

Neutral Beneish: -2.78Altman Z″: 1.97Piotroski: 5/9Fog: 18.0
RED DEEP 69 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.78
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.97
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
18.01
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The scores give a mixed picture that a casual reader should read carefully. The Beneish M-Score is -2.778, which is below the -1.78 threshold and is labeled not in the elevated zone, so this earnings-manipulation screen did not flag the filing. That is a screening result, not a finding that the numbers are accurate. The Altman Z″-Score of 1.97 falls in the grey zone between 1.10 and 2.60, a middle band of financial distress risk rather than a clean reading, and it is worth weighing alongside the 2025 revenue decline and total liabilities of $6.89 billion against assets of $11.24 billion. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 8 computable signals, meaning five of the eight checks that could be scored were passed, which is a moderate result. The Fog Index of 18.01 places the MD&A in the very hard to read band, above 18, which matters because the 10-Q narrative is where management explains results. Readers may want to look at the Item 3 market risk disclosure, which shows $165.0 million outstanding on the Revolving Facility as of June 30, 2026, where a 1.0% rate increase would add about $1.7 million of annual interest, while five named notes (4.25% 2032, 6.375% 2034, 6.75% 2035, 6.375% 2032 and 5.00% 2030) carry fixed rates. The same section notes that lumber cost changes are only sometimes passed on to customers. Taken together, the filings show a business whose 2025 earnings fell sharply, whose debt is largely fixed-rate, and whose disclosures are dense. The scores do not signal manipulation, but they do not resolve the questions the revenue and margin decline raise.

Catalyst.The MD&A excerpt provided does not include the results narrative, so the drivers below come from the filing text that is available. Management describes the business as a supplier to professional homebuilders across roughly 585 locations in 43 states, with manufactured products such as trusses, wall panels and modular homes, plus turnkey framing and installation services. Revenue for 2025 was $15.19 billion, down from $16.4 billion in 2024, a 7.4% decline. On April 29, 2026, the board authorized up to $500.0 million of share repurchases, but the company reported no repurchases under that plan in the second quarter of 2026.

Hidden risk.The most easily missed item is the construction defect litigation in Part II, Item 1. The filing says there are known and threatened claims, that many proceedings are still in discovery, and that a reasonable possibility of loss exists but cannot be estimated. Management says these claims are generally covered by insurance above the deductible, yet the filing also says coverage may not cover all liabilities and that future judgments could be material to results or liquidity. The 10-Q risk factor section states there were no material changes from the 2025 10-K. Set against net income that fell from $1.08 billion in 2024 to $435.2 million in 2025, this unquantified exposure is a tension a casual reader could overlook.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what BLDR reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
10.2%
of the shares available to trade
High
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
9.2M
Change since Aug 31
+17.1%
Days to cover
2.5

What it tells us

A large group of traders is betting that BLDR shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 17.1% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Builders FirstSource filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 7, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-03)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-07-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jun 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-06-03)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 2, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-04-02)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 17, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-17)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 30, 2025
    8-K
    Current report (2025-10-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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