Baker Hughes Company
BKR Energy · Oil & Gas Equipment & ServicesDeep value.
Flat revenue and lower 2025 profit, though operating cash flow rose to $3.81 billion
The four readings.
What the filing actually says.
The Beneish M-Score is -2.687, which the label places below -1.78 and not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result, not proof that the numbers are clean. The Piotroski F-Score is 4 of 6 computable signals, meaning four of the six signals that could be calculated from the data passed, and it is not a score out of nine. The Fog Index of 18.18 falls in the band above 18, labeled very hard to read, so the MD&A requires more effort than a typical filing. No Altman Z-score is on file for this review, so no solvency zone is assessed. Operating cash flow of $3.81 billion in 2025, up from $3.33 billion in 2024, is 1.47 times net income, which supports the reported earnings. Equity rose to $18.83 billion from $16.89 billion. In the 10-Q, the company made no open-market repurchases in the quarter ended June 30, 2026, leaving $1,348,978,828 under its $4 billion repurchase program. The filing also lists a Term Loan Facility Credit Agreement dated July 15, 2026, with Bank of America and UniCredit as administrative agents. The excerpt does not show its terms, so readers may want to check the referenced 8-K exhibits. Legal proceedings are cross-referenced to Note 16, which is not reproduced here. The data center order figures are management forecasts, so readers may want to compare them against future quarterly filings.
Catalyst.According to the 10-K business section, Baker Hughes is pursuing three pillars: transforming the core, driving profitable growth, and delivering results in new energy. The most concrete demand item is data center power. The company says it booked $1 billion of data center-related orders in 2025 and now expects about $3 billion between 2025 and 2027. Revenue was essentially flat, at $27.73 billion in 2025 versus $27.83 billion in 2024, while operating cash flow rose to $3.81 billion from $3.33 billion. The 10-Q also notes that the surface pressure control joint venture with Cactus was completed on January 1, 2026, and lists a merger agreement with Chart Industries dated July 28, 2025 among its exhibits.
Hidden risk.The most material tension is between earnings and the headline growth story. Revenue slipped 0.3% in 2025, and net income fell from $2.98 billion in 2024 to $2.59 billion, a drop of about 13.1%, even though operating cash flow rose. The excerpt does not explain the earnings decline. The 10-Q says the SAP Central Finance (cFIN) rollout modified certain finance processes and related internal controls, though management concluded disclosure controls were effective. Its risk factors are incorporated by reference from the 2025 Annual Report rather than restated, and the MD&A's Fog Index of 18.18 makes the text harder for a casual reader to parse.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 24.1M
- Change since Aug 31
- −10.0%
- Days to cover
- 2.9
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against BKR. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−10.0%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Baker Hughes Company filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Oct 1, 20268-K/ACurrent report (amended)Item 9.01: Financial Statements and Exhibits0EDGAR →
- Sep 9, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-09-09)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Jul 27, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300EDGAR →
- Jul 27, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-07-26)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Jul 16, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-07-16)Item 2.01: Completed an acquisition or sale of assets; Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 1.02: Ended a material agreement; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)EDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Apr 24, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310EDGAR →
- Apr 23, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-23)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Mar 30, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-05-19)0EDGAR →
- Mar 11, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-05)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation0EDGAR →
- Mar 2, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-02-27)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Feb 5, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
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Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
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