Brown-Forman Corporation

BF-B Consumer Defensive · Beverages - Wineries & Distilleries
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$28.58
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$22.61 — $31.92
-10% from high
Market cap
13.1B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
3.2%
P/E
18.4
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Brown-Forman's FY2026 sales dipped 1.2%, but cash flow rose and Jack Daniel's dependence persists.

Bullish Beneish: -2.66Altman Z″: 6.30Piotroski: 7/9Fog: 19.2
RED DEEP 90 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.66
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
6.30
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
7
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
19.19
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The filings show a company with high gross margins and sound cash conversion, paired with softer top-line sales and a dense MD&A. The Beneish M-Score is -2.659, which the label places below -1.78 and not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. In plain terms, this is a screening model that compares receivables, margins, asset quality, sales growth, depreciation, leverage and accruals against thresholds, and a score below -1.78 does not flag the company for a closer read on that basis. The Altman Z-double-prime Score is 6.30, in the safe zone, which indicates low modeled bankruptcy risk for a non-financial company; it says nothing about sales trends. The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 9 computable signals, meaning seven of the nine computable profitability, leverage and efficiency tests passed, a relatively favorable reading. The Fog Index of 19.19 is in the very hard to read band. Operating cash flow of $1 billion against net income of $715 million gives a ratio of 1.40 for fiscal 2026. Long-term debt fell to $2.08 billion from $2.42 billion, and total liabilities of $3.87 billion compare with assets of $7.89 billion. The risk factors name the Jack Daniel's family of brands, tariff and trade policy, shifts in consumer preference away from brown spirits, and a dual-class controlled-company structure in which the Brown family owns more than 50% of voting stock. The MD&A points to specific drags: the end of the Korbel relationship, the Non-branded and bulk line down 61% on lower used-barrel sales, and declines of 11% in Germany, 14% in France and 16% in Spain. Readers may want to look at these items alongside the Non-GAAP reconciliation and the fiscal 2026 10-K, since the scores reflect fiscal 2026 while the MD&A covers the first quarter of fiscal 2027.

Catalyst.Per the MD&A for the three months ended July 31, 2026, net sales were $911 million, down 1%, as unfavorable price/mix and the end of the Korbel relationship outweighed higher volumes and favorable foreign exchange. Growth came from New Mix, up 48% reported on higher volumes in Mexico and a United States launch, and from Mexico overall, up 26%. Ready-to-Drink rose 20%. Gross margin widened to 60.2% from 59.8%, and diluted earnings per share rose 6% to $0.38, helped by lower non-operating postretirement expense. For fiscal 2026, revenue was $3.93 billion, down from $3.98 billion in fiscal 2025.

Hidden risk.Reported and organic figures tell different stories at the operating line: reported operating income fell 3% to $252 million, while organic operating income rose 4%. The bridge between those measures sits in the Non-GAAP section, which this excerpt does not include, so readers may want to check it before weighing the gap. Concentration is also material. The United States was 42% of fiscal 2026 net sales, U.S. net sales fell 3% this quarter, and the risk factors name dependence on the Jack Daniel's family of brands and tariff changes. The Fog Index of 19.19 places the MD&A in the very hard to read band, which may make these reconciliations harder to follow.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what BF-B reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
11.0%
of the shares available to trade
High
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
31.1M
Change since Aug 31
+12.0%
Days to cover
12

What it tells us

A large group of traders is betting that BF-B shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 12.0% since the Aug 31 report.

Short sellers would need about 12 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. That is a very slow exit, so a rush to cover could move the price sharply.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statements (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Brown-Forman filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 21, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-17)No specific items found in 8-K.
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 2, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-07-31)Period: 2026-07-310
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 2, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-02)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-07-23)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jun 18, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-07-23)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jun 12, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2026-04-30)Period: 2026-04-300
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-28)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-26)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 16, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-16)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-01-31)Period: 2026-01-310
    EDGAR →
  • Jun 20, 2025
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2025-07-24)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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