Franklin Templeton Inc.

BEN Financial Services · Asset Management
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$31.38
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$21.11 — $36.28
-14% from high
Market cap
15.9B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.2%
P/E
21.3
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Franklin Templeton's 2025 profit rebounded, yet a $33.0 million impairment tracks falling AUM.

Bullish Piotroski: 7/9Fog: 15.4
RED DEEP 100 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
7
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
15.40
Dense
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 7 computable signals, meaning all seven signals the data allowed to be computed carry the label's favorable reading; this is a checklist of financial-health tests, not a guarantee of future results. The Operating cash flow to net income ratio of 2.03 means operating cash flow was about twice reported net income in fiscal 2025; net income of $524.9 million was held down relative to operating income by items the excerpt does not detail. Net income is still below fiscal 2021's $1.83 billion and fiscal 2023's $882.8 million, so the rebound is partial. Revenue growth of 3.5% year over year is modest. The Beneish M-Score and Altman Z-Score are not on file, so this synthesis gives no reading for either. The Fog Index of 15.40 indicates the MD&A is hard to read, which makes the management narrative harder to test against the numbers. Readers may want to look at the Note 15 Commitments and Contingencies section for the Western Asset Management matters, and at the Level 3 disclosure, where 4% of fair-value assets are classified as Level 3, mainly CIPs investments in equity and debt securities, with $27.1 million transferred in and $16.9 million out during the nine months ended June 30, 2026. On capital allocation, the Board authorized an additional 20.8 million shares in December 2025 for up to 40.0 million available under the repurchase program, and the 10-Q table shows 25,569,050 shares remaining as of June 2026. The filings show a company with strong reported cash generation and a passing fundamental checklist, alongside declining AUM in some products, rising liabilities, and unresolved regulatory matters that a casual reader could overlook.

Catalyst.Fiscal 2025 revenue reached $8.77 billion, up from $8.48 billion in fiscal 2024, and operating income rose to $604.1 million from $407.6 million. Franklin reports one operating segment, investment management and related services, and says investment management fees make up a majority of revenue and depend on the level and mix of assets under management (AUM), which exceeded $1.6 trillion as of September 30, 2025. Operating cash flow was $1.07 billion, compared with $971.3 million a year earlier. The MD&A excerpt provided is mostly accounting-policy text, so it offers limited management commentary on the drivers behind these results.

Hidden risk.The June 30, 2026 10-Q says there were no material changes to risk factors, yet it records $33.0 million of impairments in the quarter on indefinite-lived intangible assets tied to acquired management contracts, citing decreased AUM in related products. Forward-looking statements also flag the Western Asset Management investigations as a possible source of fines, settlements, reputational harm and asset outflows. Balance-sheet liabilities rose from $11.42 billion in fiscal 2021 to $18.18 billion in fiscal 2025, while equity fell from $12.51 billion to $12.08 billion over fiscal 2024 to 2025. The Fog Index of 15.40 falls in the hard-to-read band.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what BEN reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
4.8%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
18.4M
Change since Aug 31
+13.2%
Days to cover
4.8

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against BEN. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 13.2% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.8 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Franklin Templeton filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 10, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-05)Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation; Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-07-31)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 5.03: Charter or bylaw change; fiscal-year change; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 31, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-07-30)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 1.02: Ended a material agreement; Item 2.03: New debt or other financial obligation
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-28)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-03)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • Jan 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-01-30)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Dec 22, 2025
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-02-03)0
    EDGAR →
  • Nov 10, 2025
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-09-30)Period: 2025-09-300
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

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The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

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