Ball Corporation

BALL Consumer Cyclical · Packaging & Containers
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$62.80
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$44.83 — $68.29
-8% from high
Market cap
16.6B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.3%
P/E
17.9
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Higher aluminum prices lift Ball's sales; $7.01 billion debt remains the key tension

Neutral Altman Z″: 3.15Piotroski: 5/9Fog: 20.1
RED DEEP 69 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
3.15
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
20.13
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Read together, the filings describe a company whose reported sales growth is driven largely by pass-through of higher aluminum costs, while its balance sheet carries heavier obligations. The Altman Z"-Score of 3.15 falls in the safe zone under its label, meaning this bankruptcy-distress screen does not flag the company, although it is a statistical summary and not a forecast. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 6 computable signals, which means five of the six fundamental tests could be evaluated from the available data and five of those passed. The Fog Index of 20.13 sits in the very hard to read band, which matters because the MD&A is where the aluminum pass-through mechanics and hedging assumptions are explained. Operating cash flow divided by net income of 1.38 means 2025 operating cash flow of $1.26 billion exceeded net income of $915 million, a stronger cash position than the earnings figure alone suggests. Still, 2024 operating cash flow of $115 million against net income of $4.01 billion shows how uneven the record is. The 10-K also flags concentration risk, since a majority of packaging sales go to a limited number of major beverage, personal care and household customers, and about 53 percent of 2025 net sales came from outside the U.S. The ORG equity-linked notes produced a $27 million loss in the first half of 2026, a reminder that some financial instruments add volatility to reported results. Readers may want to look at the debt maturity schedule, the tariff disclosure in the notes, and the reconciliation between net income and operating cash flow in the 10-K.

Catalyst.Ball's 10-Q shows net sales of $7,600 million for the six months ended June 30, 2026, up $1.17 billion from $6,435 million. Management attributes $898 million of that increase to price/mix, mainly higher aluminum prices, with $131 million from currency translation and $97 million from higher volume. Net earnings attributable to Ball rose to $426 million from $391 million. The MD&A links the sales gains to aluminum pass-through provisions in customer contracts and hedging, and it notes that management is pursuing operational excellence initiatives intended to reduce fixed and variable costs to improve results in 2027 and beyond. Recent acquisitions include a Winter Haven, Florida can plant and an 80 percent capital share of Benepack's European can business from ORG Technology.

Hidden risk.The 10-K states Ball had $7.01 billion of debt at December 31, 2025. Total liabilities rose to $14.1 billion from $11.7 billion in 2024, while equity fell to $5.42 billion from $5.86 billion. Ball also disclosed a September 2025 notice from U.S. Customs and Border Protection challenging the tariff classification of certain aluminum imports. The company believes additional duties, interest and penalties could be owed, is unable to estimate the loss, and has not recorded a reserve. Operating cash flow also swings widely, from $115 million in 2024 to $1.26 billion in 2025.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what BALL reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
3.5%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
8M
Change since Aug 31
+1.9%
Days to cover
3.9

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against BALL. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+1.9%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Ball Corporation filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-09)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-04)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • May 5, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • May 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-05)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-29)Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits ​ Exhibits . ​ The following are furnished as exhibits to this report: ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Exhibit 104 Cover Page Interactive 0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 17, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-04-29)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 19, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-03)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →