AutoZone, Inc.
AZO Consumer Cyclical · Auto PartsFairly valued.
Revenue rose 2.4% in fiscal 2025, but profits fell and equity stayed negative.
The four readings.
What the filing actually says.
The forensic scores give a mixed picture that calls for a careful read. The Beneish M-Score is -2.415, which is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. This is a screening result and does not confirm that the reported figures are accurate. The Altman Z″-Score is 0.03, which falls in the distress zone. As a screening measure, it reflects the balance sheet, including the $3.41 billion shareholders' deficit, and it is not a forecast of default. The Piotroski F-Score is 6 of 9 computable signals. The Fog Index of 15.09 places the MD&A in the hard to read band, so the text takes effort to parse. Operating cash flow of $3.12 billion exceeded net income of $2.5 billion, an operating cash flow to net income ratio of 1.25. On debt, the 10-Q shows commercial paper up $609.4 million and the repayment of a $400 million 3.125% Senior Notes due April 2026. The estimated fair value of debt was $32.7 million above its carrying value at May 9, 2026. The risk factors cite tariffs on imports from Canada, China and Mexico as a possible pressure on product cost and pricing, and the 10-Q reports no material changes to risk factors since the 10-K. The company repurchased 163,694 shares in the quarter ended May 9, 2026, leaving $804.2 million available under its program. Readers may want to look at how the fiscal 2026 balance sheet and the ERP transition develop in future filings.
Catalyst.Revenues reached $18.94 billion in fiscal 2025, up 2.4% from $18.49 billion in fiscal 2024. The risk-factor text ties growth to same store sales, new store openings and new commercial programs, and notes that the store count rose from 6,549 at August 29, 2020 to 7,657 at August 30, 2025. Profits did not keep pace. Operating income declined to $3.61 billion from $3.79 billion, and net income fell to $2.5 billion from $2.66 billion. The MD&A excerpt provided is largely limited to market risk and controls, so the operating drivers behind the margin decline are not fully described in the data.
Hidden risk.The most easily missed tension is the balance sheet. Equity was negative $3.41 billion at fiscal year-end 2025, and long-term debt was $8.8 billion. The 10-Q shows variable rate debt rose to $1.4 billion at May 9, 2026, from $748.6 million at August 30, 2025, and a one percentage point rate increase would reduce pre-tax earnings by an estimated $13.6 million in fiscal 2026. The company is also partway through a new ERP system that will eventually replace its core financial systems, and management states there are inherent risks in that implementation. The Altman Z″-Score of 0.03 sits in the distress zone, which is a screening signal rather than a prediction of default.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 529.5K
- Change since Aug 31
- +21.8%
- Days to cover
- 1.3
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against AZO. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 21.8% since the Aug 31 report.
At normal trading volume, short sellers could buy back every borrowed share in under two days.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) AutoZone filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Oct 9, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-10-06)No specific items found in 8-K.EDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Sep 22, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-09-22)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Jul 14, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-07-14)Unknown Item this report is incorporated by reference into this...EDGAR →★ Curriculum-relevant
- Jun 12, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-05-09)Period: 2026-05-090EDGAR →
- Mar 20, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-02-14)Period: 2026-02-140EDGAR →
- Mar 3, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-03-03)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Dec 19, 20258-KCurrent report (2025-12-17)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Dec 9, 20258-KCurrent report (2025-12-09)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Oct 28, 2025DEF 14AProxy statement (2025-12-17)0EDGAR →
- Oct 27, 202510-KAnnual report (2025-08-30)Period: 2025-08-300EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
View on Amazon →The Interpretation of Financial Statements
The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.
View on Amazon →Quality of Earnings
Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.
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