Ares Management Corporation
ARES Financial Services · Asset ManagementFairly valued.
Ares's 2025 revenue jumped 44.2%, while its MD&A is very hard to read.
The four readings.
What the filing actually says.
Read together, the scores suggest that the reported numbers pass the standard screens, while the narrative is the harder part to follow. The Beneish M-Score for 2025 is -2.523, which is below the -1.78 threshold and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone; this is a screening result, not a finding of accuracy or fraud. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 5 computable signals, meaning all five signals that could be computed from the data were met. The Fog Index of 19.43 is above 18, which the readability label classifies as very hard to read, so the MD&A demands extra effort from a casual reader. The 2025 operating cash flow to net income ratio of 6.19 is high and should be read alongside the consolidation disclosures rather than as a simple quality marker. Balance sheet figures show total assets rising from $24.88 billion to $28.63 billion and equity from $3.54 billion to $4.28 billion in 2025, while liabilities rose from $17.49 billion to $19.93 billion. The 10-Q lists Amendment No. 14, dated May 21, 2026, to the Sixth Amended and Restated Senior Credit Agreement with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. as agent, and a 6.75% Series B Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock certificate of designations, both of which readers may want to review in the full filing. Item 3 reports no material changes in market risk, and Item 4 concludes that disclosure controls were effective at the reasonable assurance level as of June 30, 2026. Readers may want to look at how management fees, performance income and fund-level investment income are split in the segment note, since the excerpt does not provide that breakdown.
Catalyst.According to the annual figures in the data, Ares's total revenues rose from $3.88 billion in 2024 to $5.6 billion in 2025, a 44.2% year-over-year increase, and net income rose from $463.74 million to $527.36 million. Operating cash flow was $3.27 billion in 2025 versus $2.79 billion in 2024. The 10-Q excerpt for the period ended June 30, 2026 is largely cross-references and does not explain which business lines produced this growth, so the drivers cannot be confirmed from the provided text. The 10-K risk-factor excerpt does describe fee-related earnings, performance revenues and the segment basis, which is where readers may want to look for the breakdown.
Hidden risk.The most material tension is the gap between reported cash generation and how the figures are presented. Operating cash flow was negative in every year from 2018 through 2023, then turned positive in 2024 and 2025, and the 2025 operating cash flow is about 6.19 times net income. The risk-factor excerpt explains that consolidated funds, CLOs and joint ventures are reported on a gross basis under GAAP, with third-party interests shown as non-controlling interests, so consolidated totals should not be read as the firm's own economics. Separately, a May 26, 2026 derivative action alleging excessive advisory fees under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act is in preliminary stages, and the company says it cannot estimate any loss.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 15.5M
- Change since Aug 31
- −0.3%
- Days to cover
- 7.0
What it tells us
A large group of traders is betting that ARES shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−0.3%).
Short sellers would need about 7.0 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Ares Management filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Sep 30, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-09-30)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Aug 7, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300EDGAR →
- Jul 31, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-07-31)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Jul 10, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-07-10)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings); Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0EDGAR →
- Apr 21, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2025-12-31)0EDGAR →
- Feb 25, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
View on Amazon →The Interpretation of Financial Statements
The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.
View on Amazon →Quality of Earnings
Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.
View on Amazon →