Aon plc

AON Financial Services · Insurance Brokers
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$286.80
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$266.33 — $382.34
-25% from high
Market cap
60.8B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.1%
P/E
15.8
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Aon's organic growth is real, but divestitures and dense disclosures cloud reported results

Neutral Beneish: -2.36Altman Z″: 1.13Piotroski: 6/9Fog: 18.6
RED DEEP 69 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.36
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.13
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
6
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
18.55
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Read together, the filings show a firm growing its core Risk Capital business while reshaping its perimeter. The forensic scores give a mixed but mostly reassuring picture. The Beneish M-Score is -2.382, which is below -1.78 and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. This is a screening model built from accounting ratios, so it is a flag check rather than a verdict, but this result does not raise one. The Altman Z-double-prime score is 1.13, in the grey zone between 1.10 and 2.60. The label notes that Altman Z is not designed for banks or financial firms, so this figure should be treated with caution for a broker, and it is not a distress call on its own. The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 8 computable signals, which reflects strong results on most of the profitability, leverage, liquidity, and efficiency checks. The Fog Index of 18.55 means the MD&A is very hard to read, which is a reason to read the tables rather than rely on the prose. Other figures add context. Operating cash flow of $3.48 billion in 2025 was 0.94 times net income of $3.69 billion, so cash generation trailed earnings slightly. Total equity moved from negative $826 million in 2023 to $9.35 billion in 2025, and long-term debt fell from $16.27 billion in 2024 to $14.66 billion in 2025. Second-quarter net income decreased $29 million, or 5%, while six-month net income rose $228 million, or 14%, so timing matters. Readers may want to look at the cash tax payment tied to the NFP Wealth sale, the Irish distributable-profits rules that govern dividends and buybacks, and the reconciliation between organic and reported growth.

Catalyst.Risk Capital is the main growth driver in the 10-Q. Its six-month revenue rose $451 million, or 7%, to $6,508 million, and management credits 5% organic revenue growth from net new business and ongoing strong retention. Human Capital revenue fell $53 million, or 2%, over the same period. Divestitures, mainly NFP Wealth and Stroz Friedberg, subtracted about 4% from revenue. Management also cites $50 million of net restructuring savings in the first six months. Full-year 2025 revenue reached $17.18 billion, up 9.4% from $15.7 billion in 2024. Six-month operating cash flow was $986 million, up 5%.

Hidden risk.The main tension is between headline growth and what drives it. Reported six-month revenue grew 4%, but organic growth of 5% was offset by a 4% divestiture drag, so the portfolio is shrinking in some areas while it grows in others. The 10-K says much of revenue is a percentage of premiums charged to clients, so softening insurance pricing can reduce commissions. The risk factors also flag E&O claims, a possible decline in credit ratings that could raise borrowing costs, and the possibility that Accelerating Aon United benefits fall short. The MD&A's Fog Index of 18.55 is in the very hard to read band, which may make these points harder to find.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what AON reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
2.0%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
4.2M
Change since Aug 31
+11.7%
Days to cover
1.9

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against AON. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 11.7% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers could buy back every borrowed share in under two days.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Aon filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 22, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-18)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 1.02: Ended a material agreement
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-14)Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 11, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-11)Item 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 1.01: Signed a material agreement; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 29, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 29, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • May 1, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
  • May 1, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-05-01)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 28, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-06-26)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Jan 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-01-30)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →