Amazon.com, Inc.

AMZN Consumer Cyclical · Internet Retail
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$254.76
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$196.00 — $287.20
-11% from high
Market cap
2.7T
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
—
No dividend declared
P/E
20.5
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Amazon's 2025 earnings rose, but nine-month capex far exceeded operating cash flow

Bullish Beneish: -2.63Altman Z″: 2.80Piotroski: 5/9Fog: 19.0
RED DEEP 77 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.63
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
2.80
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
19.02
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The forensic scores give a mixed picture, and each one should be read for what it measures. The Beneish M-Score is -2.648, which is below the -1.78 threshold and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. This is a statistical screen built from financial ratios, not a finding about intent, and a clean reading does not rule out every concern. The Altman Z-Score is 2.80, in the safe zone, which indicates a low statistical likelihood of financial distress on this model. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 7 computable signals, a count of simple profitability, leverage, and efficiency checks that passed; the other signals could not be computed from the data provided. The Fog Index of 19.02 falls in the very hard to read band, so the MD&A demands careful, patient reading. Operating cash flow divided by net income is 1.80 for 2025, meaning reported operating cash flow was about 1.8 times net income, which is a constructive sign of cash conversion. Even so, nine-month non-operating gains and rising capital spending mean the cash flow statement deserves as much attention as the income statement. Equity rose to $411.06 billion from $285.97 billion, and total assets reached $818.04 billion. Property and equipment, net, grew to $324.44 billion at September 30, 2025 from $252.67 billion at December 31, 2024, reflecting the infrastructure build-out the filings describe. Readers may want to look at how the disclosed AWS and AI investments translate into segment revenue and margins in future filings.

Catalyst.Amazon's fiscal 2025 revenue reached $716.92 billion, up 12.4% from $637.96 billion in 2024, and operating income rose to $79.97 billion from $68.59 billion. The MD&A describes growth from product and service sales, including compute, storage, database, fulfillment, advertising, and digital subscriptions, and says spending on technology and infrastructure, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, will increase over time. In the nine months ended September 30, 2025, technology and infrastructure expense was $79.12 billion, up from $64.97 billion a year earlier. Recent headlines describe AI chip and cloud agreements with Meta and Anthropic, but the filings excerpts provided do not detail those deals.

Hidden risk.The easiest tension to miss is between earnings and cash. In the nine months ended September 30, 2025, purchases of property and equipment were $92.30 billion against net cash from operating activities of $85.06 billion, a shortfall of $7.24 billion. The 10-Q says technology spending can weigh on short-term free cash flow. Nine-month net income was $56.48 billion, but other income, net contributed $14.05 billion, compared with a $2.72 billion expense a year earlier, so non-operating items account for a meaningful part of recent profit. Long-term debt rose to $65.65 billion from $52.62 billion. Risk factors also cite memory chip supply, tariffs, and government investigations, and an April 2026 headline reports a California collusion claim.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what AMZN reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
0.9%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
86.7M
Change since Aug 31
−5.9%
Days to cover
2.5

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against AMZN. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Little changed since the Aug 31 report (−5.9%).

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Amazon.com filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 30, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-14)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 9, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-20)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 9, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-09)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 16, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-16)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-13)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-27)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 6, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-05)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Nov 20, 2025
    8-K
    Current report (2025-11-20)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
Recent material news

What the desk read this week

Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

View on Amazon →

The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

View on Amazon →

Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

View on Amazon →