Amcor plc

AMCR Consumer Cyclical · Packaging & Containers
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$43.74
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$36.25 — $50.94
-14% from high
Market cap
20.2B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
5.9%
P/E
17.6
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Berry merger lifted Amcor's sales 56.6%; interest costs and dense MD&A warrant close reading.

Bullish Altman Z″: 1.21Piotroski: 7/9Fog: 18.4
RED DEEP 76 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
1.21
Grey zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
7
Strong
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
18.38
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Read together, the forensic scores describe a company whose reported figures look internally consistent but whose disclosure is dense. The Beneish M-Score is -2.468, below -1.78, so it is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. This is a screening threshold, not proof that the numbers are accurate, and it cannot rule out problems the model does not detect. The Altman Z-Score (Z-double-prime version) of 1.21 sits in the grey zone between 1.10 and 2.60, a range that signals balance-sheet pressure relative to the standard benchmark, which is relevant given liabilities of $25.29 billion. The Piotroski F-Score is 8 of 8 computable signals, a strong reading on the criteria it measures. The Fog Index of 18.38 falls in the very hard to read band, so readers may want to work through the Berry Plan and segment tables slowly. Several items deserve specific attention. Argentina is reported under highly inflationary accounting, producing $19 million of foreign currency transaction losses in fiscal 2026, although Argentina represented less than 1% of total assets. The strategic review covering businesses with $2.5 billion of combined sales has no set deadline or definitive timetable. The trade policy risk factor describes tariff changes that management says may not be fully offset by price and cost actions. Finally, the board approved a change in fiscal year end to December 31, with a six-month Form 10-K/T covering July 1 through December 31, 2026, which will make year-over-year comparisons harder to read. Equity rose from $3.88 billion in fiscal 2024 to $11.73 billion in fiscal 2025, a change tied to the approximately 846 million ordinary shares issued to Berry shareholders before the 1-for-5 reverse split.

Catalyst.Fiscal 2026 (ended June 30, 2026) was the first full fiscal year including Berry Global, which Amcor acquired on April 30, 2025 for $10.4 billion of purchase consideration plus about $5.2 billion of Berry debt assumed. Net sales rose to $23.51 billion from $15.01 billion, and operating income reached $1.9 billion versus $1.01 billion. Management points to a Berry Plan targeting about $530 million of pre-tax synergies by June 30, 2028, and to portfolio pruning: four businesses identified in the strategic review were sold for $298 million of cash. Management also cites softer consumer demand and higher energy and raw material costs linked to the Middle East conflict.

Hidden risk.Interest expense rose to $676 million from $396 million, and at June 30, 2026 total liabilities were $25.29 billion against equity of $11.79 billion. Amortization of acquired intangible assets climbed to $558 million from $246 million. Restructuring, transaction and integration expenses of $298 million (versus $307 million the prior year) have now appeared in both years, so readers may want to treat them as a recurring cost. Operating cash flow of $2.15 billion is 1.94 times net income, a ratio that is worth comparing against the roughly $157 million of net cash spent on Berry restructuring and integration in fiscal 2026. The Fog Index of 18.38 signals a hard-to-read MD&A.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what AMCR reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
5.0%
of the shares available to trade
Moderate
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
21.6M
Change since Aug 31
+11.9%
Days to cover
6.5

What it tells us

A noticeable minority of traders is betting that AMCR shares will fall.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 11.9% since the Aug 31 report.

Short sellers would need about 6.5 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Amcor filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 29, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-11-11)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 14, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 14, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-11)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 12, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-12)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Jun 15, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-06-10)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • May 7, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-03-31)Period: 2026-03-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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