Albemarle Corporation

ALB Basic Materials · Specialty Chemicals
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$98.18
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$88.01 — $221.00
-56% from high
Market cap
11.6B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
1.7%
P/E
363.6
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Deep value.

Albemarle's 2026 rebound rests on lithium pricing after two years of net losses.

Bullish Altman Z″: 3.12Piotroski: 5/9Fog: 17.7
RED DEEP 76 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
3.12
Safe
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
5
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
17.69
Dense
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Albemarle's filings show a company returning toward profitability on higher lithium prices, but the annual numbers and the scores point to a more mixed picture. Revenue for 2025 was $5.14 billion, down 4.4% from $5.38 billion in 2024, and net income was negative $510.63 million, compared with a loss of $1.18 billion in 2024. Operating cash flow of $1.28 billion in 2025 was positive despite the net loss. The operating cash flow to net income ratio of -2.51 is negative only because net income is negative, so it is not meaningful as a quality measure here. The Beneish M-Score of -3.652 is below -1.78 and is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone; this is a screening result, not proof that the numbers are accurate. The Altman Z″-Score of 3.12 falls in the safe zone, which speaks to balance-sheet distress risk on this model rather than to lithium price exposure. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 8 computable signals, a middle reading that does not separate strong from weak fundamentals on its own. The Fog Index of 17.69 places the MD&A in the hard-to-read band, so retail readers may need extra effort to follow the discussion of index-referenced contracts, joint-venture accounting and the Refining Solutions divestiture. Specific items to check include the CGP3 fire remediation timeline, the 49% retained interest in Refining Solutions, the fully owned Performance Catalysts Solutions business, and the company's 2026 outlook that Specialties net sales and profitability will be slightly above 2025 results. Equity was $9.53 billion at year-end 2025 against long-term debt of $3.12 billion, and the use of divestiture proceeds to repay senior notes reflects the deleveraging effort the filing describes.

Catalyst.Management attributes the current momentum mainly to lithium pricing. In the second quarter of 2026, net sales were $1.7 billion, up 31% year-over-year, primarily driven by a 42% increase in pricing, and adjusted EBITDA rose 155%, led by Energy Storage and Specialties. Operating cash flow for the first six months of 2026 was $1.1 billion, up 96%. The company also completed the sale of its controlling interest in Refining Solutions and its 50% stake in Eurecat, with combined pre-tax proceeds of approximately $648 million used to pay down certain senior notes. Management expects Energy Storage results to rise if 2026 lithium pricing stays near current levels.

Hidden risk.The rebound is price-led and rests on a volatile input. The filing says Energy Storage profitability depends strongly on lithium market prices and that many contracts are index-referenced, so pricing moves can cut results as quickly as they lifted them. The 2025 fiscal year still showed a net loss of $510.63 million and an operating loss of $367.08 million, and long-term debt stood at $3.12 billion at year-end 2025. The Talison joint venture's CGP3 fire at Greenbushes is expected to be remediated only in the second half of 2026, and the company warns it may face indemnity claims tied to divested businesses. Readers may want to look at the risk factor on indemnity claims linked to Refining Solutions.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what ALB reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
11.4%
of the shares available to trade
High
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
11.8M
Change since Aug 31
+22.1%
Days to cover
4.5

What it tells us

A large group of traders is betting that ALB shares will fall. That is a strong negative view, and also a crowd that would have to buy shares back if the price rises.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 22.1% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 4.5 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Albemarle filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-02)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 21, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-19)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-05)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 5, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 23, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 24, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2025-12-31)0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 11, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

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Financial Shenanigans

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

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The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

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