The AES Corporation

AES Utilities · Utilities - Diversified
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$14.97
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$13.21 — $17.65
-15% from high
Market cap
10.7B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
4.7%
P/E
5.6
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Watch.

AES's pending take-private merger and auditor change overlap with a sharp 2025 profit drop.

Caution Beneish: -2.75Piotroski: 3/9Fog: 22.9
RED DEEP 40 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.75
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
3
Weak fundamentals
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
22.88
Obfuscatory prose
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

The forensic scores present a mixed picture. The Beneish M-Score is -2.752, which is below -1.78 and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. This is a screening result, so it means the score does not call for a closer read on that measure, but it does not confirm that the reported figures are accurate. The Piotroski F-Score is 3 of 7 computable signals, meaning only three of the seven computable tests of profitability, leverage, and efficiency were favorable, which fits a year in which net income declined. The Fog Index of 22.88 falls in the very hard to read band, so a reader working through the MD&A should expect dense language. The 10-Q MD&A excerpt is dominated by merger disclosures, including the Burdensome Condition language, the June 1, 2027 outside date with possible extensions, and Parent-consent limits on acquisitions, disposals, and debt. Readers may want to look at the 2025 10-K's Item 7 and Item 7A, which discuss project-level non-recourse financing and the hedging of fuel and interest rate exposure, since those topics relate directly to the gap between operating cash flow and net income. Balance-sheet context also matters: total assets rose to $51.77 billion while equity reached $4.06 billion, roughly $12.75 of assets for each dollar of equity. The company also has $264 million remaining under its repurchase authorization, but no repurchases were made in the second quarter of 2026. Readers may want to watch the KPMG audit for fiscal 2026, the Merger closing conditions, and any update on remediation of the AES Brasil material weakness.

Catalyst.Management's current focus, as described in the June 30, 2026 10-Q, is the pending Merger with Horizon Parent, L.P., signed March 1, 2026 and approved by shareholders on June 26, 2026, with closing expected in late 2026 or early 2027. Operationally, the 2025 10-K points to a backlog of 12.0 GW, including 5.7 GW under construction, after 4.0 GW of new long-term renewable contracts and 3.2 GW completed in 2025. Management also highlights projected double-digit rate base growth at AES Indiana and AES Ohio through 2027 and data center demand in its utility service areas. Reported revenue, however, slipped to $12.23 billion in 2025 from $12.28 billion in 2024, a 0.4% decline.

Hidden risk.The most easily missed tension is between cash flow and earnings. Operating cash flow rose to $4.31 billion in 2025 from $2.75 billion in 2024, yet net income fell to $910 million from $1.68 billion, so operating cash flow was 4.73 times net income. The 10-Q also adds governance friction: EY was dismissed on July 21, 2026 because it will no longer be independent after the Merger, and EY's 2024 internal control report was adverse due to a material weakness in controls over the AES Brasil disposition process. The Merger agreement restricts additional debt without Parent consent, subject to certain exceptions, and a termination fee of approximately $321 million may be payable in specified cases. The company and its directors also face two filed complaints and sixteen demand letters tied to the Merger.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what AES reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
3.3%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
23.6M
Change since Aug 31
+35.3%
Days to cover
2.9

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against AES. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 35.3% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 2.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) The AES filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Sep 17, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-17)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 16, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-14)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors
    ★ Curriculum-relevant
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-27)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 4, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 27, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 4.01: Change of auditor0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 30, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-29)Item 5.07: Shareholder vote results0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 16, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-14)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 20, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-04-29)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 19, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-13)Item 1.01: Signed a material agreement0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 2, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
  • Nov 4, 2025
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2025-09-30)Period: 2025-09-300
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

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Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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