Arch Capital Group Ltd.
ACGL Financial Services · Insurance - DiversifiedDeep value.
Arch's revenue and equity grew sharply in 2025, but operating cash flow fell.
The four readings.
What the filing actually says.
The forensic scores give mixed signals that call for a careful read rather than a conclusion. The Beneish M-Score is -2.457, which is below the -1.78 threshold and therefore not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone; this is a screening result, not proof that the reported numbers are accurate. The Piotroski F-Score is 5 of 6 computable signals, a relatively strong reading on the signals that could be computed from the data. The Altman Z-Score is 1.27, in the distress zone, but that zone is not designed for insurers and reinsurers, so it says little about Arch's solvency on its own. The Fog Index of 18.78 means the MD&A is very hard to read, which matters because the cash flow decline and reserve assumptions are the places where a casual reader needs the most clarity. Balance sheet growth is substantial: assets rose to $79.24 billion from $70.91 billion, and equity rose to $24.21 billion from $20.82 billion. The 2026 second-quarter buybacks and the $3.0 billion authorization increase add to capital returned to shareholders, while the June 9, 2026 Third Supplemental Indenture with The Bank of New York Mellon as trustee, filed as Exhibit 4.1 to an 8-K, reflects an active debt program. The 10-Q reports no material pending litigation as of June 30, 2026 and effective disclosure controls. Readers may want to look at the full Item 1A and Item 7 sections of the 10-K, since the excerpts supplied are truncated and the cash flow decline is not explained in the text provided. No news headlines were on file for this synthesis.
Catalyst.According to the annual figures in the data, revenues rose to $19.93 billion in 2025 from $17.44 billion in 2024, a 14.3% increase, and net income reached $4.4 billion compared with $4.31 billion. The 10-K business section says Arch wrote $16.5 billion of net premiums in 2025 across insurance, reinsurance and mortgage insurance, and book value per share rose to $65.11 from $53.11. In the second quarter of 2026 the company repurchased 12,359,957 common shares, and on April 19, 2026 its repurchase authorization was increased by $3.0 billion, leaving about $2.16 billion available at June 30, 2026. The MD&A excerpt supplied is largely controls and legal text, so the operating narrative here rests mainly on reported figures.
Hidden risk.The most easily missed tension is cash generation. Operating cash flow fell to $6.17 billion in 2025 from $6.67 billion in 2024 even though net income rose slightly, so operating cash flow per dollar of net income dropped to 1.40. Total liabilities grew to $55.03 billion from $50.09 billion. The Altman Z-Score of 1.27 falls in the distress zone, but the label notes that Altman Z is not designed for banks or financial firms, so it should be read with caution here. The 10-K risk factors name reserve adequacy, catastrophic losses, reinsurance recoverables and cyber incidents tied to artificial intelligence, and the 10-Q states there were no material changes to them. The MD&A Fog Index of 18.78 is in the very hard to read band.
What traders are betting.
The metric
Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.
- Shares sold short
- 7.7M
- Change since Aug 31
- +4.6%
- Days to cover
- 1.7
What it tells us
Few traders are betting against ACGL. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.
Little changed since the Aug 31 report (+4.6%).
At normal trading volume, short sellers could buy back every borrowed share in under two days.
How investors use it
- Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
- Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
- Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
- Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.
Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement
The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Arch Capital Group filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.
- Aug 4, 202610-QQuarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300EDGAR →
- Jul 28, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-07-28)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Jun 16, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-06-15)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Jun 9, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-06-09)Unknown Item this report is incorporated by reference into this...0EDGAR →
- Apr 28, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-28)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Apr 20, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-04-19)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Mar 24, 2026DEF 14AProxy statement (2026-05-05)0EDGAR →
- Feb 26, 20268-KCurrent report (2026-02-26)No specific items found in 8-K.0EDGAR →
- Feb 26, 202610-KAnnual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310EDGAR →
- Nov 6, 202510-QQuarterly report (2025-09-30)Period: 2025-09-300EDGAR →
If this case caught your eye
Financial Shenanigans
Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.
View on Amazon →The Interpretation of Financial Statements
The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.
View on Amazon →Quality of Earnings
Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.
View on Amazon →