AbbVie Inc.

ABBV Healthcare · Drug Manufacturers - General
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$283.40
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$190.75 — $291.33
-3% from high
Market cap
500.8B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.4%
P/E
77.4
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Red flags.

Revenue rose 8.6% in 2025, but net income slipped while equity turned negative.

Bearish Beneish: -2.86Altman Z″: -0.34Piotroski: 6/9Fog: 15.6
RED DEEP 35 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.86
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Altman Z″ Bankruptcy proximity
-0.34
Distress zone
0 threshold 1.10 / 2.60 4.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
6
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
Fog Index MD&A readability
15.61
Dense
8 threshold ≥ 18 = murky 24
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

Read together, the filings show a company with growing revenue and strong operating cash generation, but thinner profit to shareholders and a heavily leveraged balance sheet. The Beneish M-Score of -2.860 is below the -1.78 threshold and is not in the elevated manipulation-risk zone. That is a screening result and does not rule out questions about individual line items. The Piotroski F-Score is 7 of 8 computable signals, which points to generally sound fundamentals on the measures it tests. The Altman Z″-Score of -0.34 is in the distress zone. It is a broad solvency screen, and with $64.5 billion of long-term debt and large intangible assets it deserves attention, though it is not a forecast of default. The Fog Index of 15.61 falls in the hard-to-read band, so the MD&A requires a careful read. Operating cash flow of $19.03 billion equals 4.50 times net income, meaning cash earnings run well above accounting profit, which may partly reflect non-cash charges such as the amortization noted in the 10-Q. The pipeline story is mixed. The Phase 3 EPCORE DLBCL-1 trial for Epkinly did not show a statistically significant overall survival improvement, while EPCORE DLBCL-4 met its progression-free survival endpoint. The Boey complete response letter cited manufacturing process questions rather than safety or efficacy concerns. The $100 billion U.S. investment pledge and the three-year tariff and price-mandate exemption are significant but depend on ongoing government arrangements. Readers may want to look at the full Item 1A risk factors, since the excerpt provided is mostly the table of contents and business description.

Catalyst.According to the 10-Q MD&A, AbbVie's six-month 2026 results show worldwide net revenues of $32.0 billion, up 11% on a reported basis and 10% at constant currency, with diluted earnings per share of $2.42. Management points to a run of approvals, including Skyrizi for children with plaque psoriasis in the U.S. and Europe, Venclexta combined with acalabrutinib for previously untreated CLL, and Rinvoq approvals in the EU for vitiligo and alopecia areata. The 2025 10-K shows revenues of $61.16 billion, up 8.6% from $56.33 billion, and operating income of $15.07 billion, up from $9.14 billion.

Hidden risk.The most material tension is between revenue growth and what reaches shareholders. Full-year 2025 net income was $4.23 billion, slightly below $4.28 billion in 2024, even though operating income rose to $15.07 billion. The 10-Q cites $3.4 billion of intangible asset amortization and $3.9 billion of contingent consideration fair value changes in the first half of 2026. Equity was negative $3.27 billion at year-end 2025 after $3.33 billion a year earlier, and long-term debt stood at $64.5 billion. The Altman Z″-Score of -0.34 falls in the distress zone, which is a screening signal rather than a forecast. Pricing pressure also looms, since Botox was selected for government-set Medicare prices beginning in 2028.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what ABBV reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
1.0%
of the shares available to trade
Low
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
16.3M
Change since Aug 31
−16.6%
Days to cover
3.9

What it tells us

Few traders are betting against ABBV. Levels this low are common for large, widely held companies.

Short sellers closed some of their bets: shares sold short fell 16.6% since the Aug 31 report.

At normal trading volume, short sellers would need about 3.9 days to buy back every borrowed share.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly report & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly report (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) AbbVie filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Oct 15, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-10-05)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Sep 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-09-03)Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 18, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-08-18)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 5, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 8.01: Other events0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 3, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2026-06-30)Period: 2026-06-300
    EDGAR →
  • Jul 31, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Apr 3, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-04-03)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 23, 2026
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2026-05-08)0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 4, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-03-04)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 26, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-24)No specific items found in 8-K.0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 20, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2025-12-31)Period: 2025-12-310
    EDGAR →
Further reading · curated for this filing

If this case caught your eye

Affiliate links — Filing.fyi earns a commission on Amazon purchases. We pick the books first, attach the link second.

Financial Shenanigans

Howard M. Schilit

Schilit's framework for the seven shenanigan types is the standard reference for the kind of MD&A pattern-matching this site does.

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The Interpretation of Financial Statements

Benjamin Graham

The original — and still the clearest — explanation of why working-capital trends matter more than headline earnings.

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Quality of Earnings

Thornton L. O'glove

Out of print, expensive, worth it. The chapter on receivables-vs-revenue divergence applies almost word-for-word to most distressed filings.

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