Advance Auto Parts, Inc.

AAP Consumer Cyclical · Auto Parts
Delayed 15 min
Last close
$43.92
Oct 16, 2026
52-week range
$37.89 — $65.20
-33% from high
Market cap
2.7B
Diluted basis
Dividend yield
2.3%
P/E
24.4
Trailing
Filing.fyi verdict · Oct 16, 2026

Fairly valued.

Revenue fell 5.4% and operating cash flow turned negative as debt nearly doubled.

Neutral Beneish: -2.87Piotroski: 4/9
RED DEEP 74 / 100
Composite Health
Forensic readings · derived from the latest filing

The four readings.

Each score answers a different question. The composite at the top is the average; the disagreement below is the story.
Beneish M Earnings manipulation
-2.87
Clean
−3.0 threshold −1.78 +1.0
Piotroski F Fundamental health (0–9)
4
Mixed
0 threshold 6+ 9
AI synthesis · written from this company's SEC filings · not investment advice

What the filing actually says.

AI · forensic preset

No forensic scores are on file for this company, so this synthesis does not cite a Beneish M-Score, Piotroski F-Score, Altman Z-Score or Fog Index value, and none should be inferred from the figures here. The filing text supplied is also not a complete picture. The risk-factor excerpt is labeled as Item 1A but actually contains the third-quarter 2025 Form 10-Q financial statements, so the risk narrative must be read from the full 10-K. Those statements show net sales of $6,628 million for the forty weeks ended October 4, 2025, versus $7,098 million a year earlier, and an operating loss of $87 million versus operating income of $107 million. Interest expense rose to $86 million from $62 million, reflecting the larger debt load. Cash and cash equivalents were $3,174 million at October 4, 2025, up from $1,869 million at December 28, 2024, largely from the notes issuance. The MD&A also describes estimation-heavy areas: vendor volume incentives that depend on projected purchases, a self-insurance reserve of $156 million at January 3, 2026, where a 10% change would shift expense by about $16 million, and inventory reserves tied to SKU-level lifecycle judgments. Taken together, the reported figures show a company with lower sales, restructuring-driven losses, and higher borrowings, with several large reserve balances that depend on management estimates. Readers may want to look at the full 10-K notes on restructuring, vendor receivables, and debt maturities to understand these items in context.

Catalyst.The 10-K for the period ending January 3, 2026 reports revenue of $8.6 billion, down from $9.09 billion in fiscal 2024, a decline of about 5.4%. The MD&A centers heavily on restructuring, which cost $204 million in fiscal 2025, $309 million in fiscal 2024 and $16 million in fiscal 2023. Net income was $44 million for fiscal 2025, compared with a loss of $335.79 million in fiscal 2024, yet operating income was a loss of $43 million. The MD&A also describes a 2025 Senior Unsecured Notes issuance that funded the redemption of the 5.90% Senior Notes due 2026, and a new ABL Facility with no borrowings outstanding. Readers may want to look at what drove the gap between the operating loss and positive net income, since the excerpt does not fully explain it.

Hidden risk.The most material tension a casual reader could miss is the balance sheet set against cash generation. Long-term debt rose from $1.79 billion at fiscal 2024 year-end to $3.41 billion at fiscal 2025 year-end, while operating cash flow was negative $46 million, down from positive $84.63 million. The Item 7A text says a hypothetical 100 basis point rate change would have an annualized impact of about $31 million based on cash, and that future ABL borrowings would carry variable rates. Separately, the excess and obsolete inventory reserve fell from $302 million to $68 million, and the MD&A discloses a $28 million non-cash charge tied to estimated credit losses on a bankrupt vendor's receivables. Readers may want to check how these reserve reductions relate to the restructuring plan charges.

Market signals · from trading data, not filings

What traders are betting.

The scores above come from what AAP reports to the SEC. These readings come from how traders are positioned in its shares. They change quickly, they can be wrong, and they are not part of the verdict.
Short interest Shares sold short · reported twice a month
30.0%
of the shares available to trade
Very high
0%5% · 10% · 20%25%+

The metric

Shares that traders have borrowed and sold, betting the price will fall, and not yet bought back. Brokers report the total to FINRA twice a month. Days to cover divides it by the shares that change hands on a typical day.

Shares sold short
11.2M
Change since Aug 31
+14.2%
Days to cover
6.2

What it tells us

Bets against AAP are unusually crowded. If the price rises, short sellers racing to buy shares back can push it higher still. That is called a short squeeze.

Short sellers added to their bets: shares sold short grew 14.2% since the Aug 31 report.

Short sellers would need about 6.2 days of normal trading to buy back every borrowed share. A slow exit like that can make a rush to cover sharper.

How investors use it

  • Squeeze watching. Some aggressive traders seek out heavily shorted stocks, betting that good news will force short sellers to buy back shares and push the price higher.
  • Hedging. Funds short one company to offset risk in another, often owning a stronger business and shorting a weaker one in the same industry.
  • Timing. Chart-based traders pair rising short interest with price patterns, such as a break below a level where buyers used to step in, to decide when to enter or exit.
  • Warning sign. Some owners treat a sharp rise in short interest as a red flag and respond by tightening stop-loss orders or holding smaller positions.

Lesson: short interest, explained →

Short-interest report for Sep 30, 2026, via Yahoo Finance. Reports come out about a week and a half after that date.

SEC filings · last 12 months

Annual report, quarterly reports & proxy statement

The annual report (10-K), quarterly reports (10-Q), proxy statement (DEF 14A) and current reports (8-K) Advance Auto Parts filed in the last 12 months, each linked to the original document on SEC EDGAR.

  • Aug 20, 2026
    8-K
    Current reportItem 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Aug 20, 2026
    10-Q
    Quarterly report0
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    10-K
    Annual report (2026-01-03)Period: 2026-01-030
    EDGAR →
  • Feb 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-02-13)Item 2.02: Results of operations (earnings)0
    EDGAR →
  • Jan 13, 2026
    8-K
    Current report (2026-01-12)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors; Item 7.01: Regulation FD disclosure (investor materials)0
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 30, 2025
    10-Q
    Quarterly report (2025-10-04)Period: 2025-10-040
    EDGAR →
  • Oct 30, 2025
    8-K
    Current report (2025-10-27)Item 5.02: Departure/appointment of officers or directors0
    EDGAR →
  • Mar 21, 2025
    DEF 14A
    Proxy statement (2025-03-21)0
    EDGAR →
Recent material news

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Further reading · curated for this filing

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Quality of Earnings

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